The question presented in this case is whether New York's prohibition of assisted suicide violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The resolution of this question will have profound implications for the continued viability of the essential role of the States in our federal system of government. In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, this Court cautioned that:

                     "It must be remembered ... that every claim arising under

                the Equal Protection Clause has implications for the relationship

                between national and state power under our federal system. 

                Questions of federalism are always inherent in the process of 

                determining whether a State's laws are to be accorded the 

                traditional presumption of constitutionality, or are to be subjected

                instead to rigorous judiciary scrutiny. While '[t]he maintenance 

                of the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration in 

                interpreting any of the pertinent constitutional provisions under 

                which this Court examines state action,' it would be difficult to 

                imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our federal 

                system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to 

                abrogate system of financing public education presently in 

                existence in virtually every State." San Antonio School 

                District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973) (footnote omitted).

Twenty-three years after this Court decided San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,"...a case having a greater potential impact on our federal system..." has arrived - a case in which prohibitions of assisted suicide presently in existence in the vast majority of States are at stake.(2) Id. Perhaps the best evidence of its potential impact on the Nation is the sheer number of conflict created by the Second Circuit's opinion. In Quill, the Second Circuit declared that New York's statutes prohibiting assisted suicide violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Quill, supra, 80 F.3d at 731. That holding conflicts squarely with the recent holding of the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Kevorkian.(3) In addition, the rationale utilized by the Second Circuit in rendering its holding directly conflicts with numerous state court opinions. The centerpiece of the Second Circuit's opinion is unquestionably its conclusion that terminally ill persons on life support who wish to "hasten their deaths" by directing the withdrawal of such systems are similarly situated with others who wish to "hasten death by self-administering prescribed drugs." (4)Quill, supra, 80 F.3d at 729. However,"...those courts that have found a right to refuse to begin or to continue life-sustaining medical treatment have done so only after concluding that such refusal is wholly different from the act of suicide."(5) Numerous state legislatures have likewise recognized this fundamental distinction.(6) Finally, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Public Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), this Court "assume[d] that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition" but, at the same time, recognized Missouri's important interest in the protection and preservation of human life, noting that "the majority of States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide." Cruzan, supra, 497 U.S. at 297-280 (footnote omitted). Plainly, the majority in Cruzan had no difficulty at all distinguishing the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, on the one hand, and the act of suicide, on the other.

Notwithstanding this overwhelming authority to the contrary, the Second Circuit erroneously concluded that the two situations are indistinguishable. Quill, supra, 80 F.3d at 729. As will be seen, the Second Circuit's failure to make this critical distinction infected its constitutional analysis, contributed to its misplaced reliance on right-to-refuse treatment cases, and led directly to its ultimate erroneous conclusion. The conflicts created by the Second Circuit's opinion, involving an issue of such exceptional and profound nationwide importance, can only be resolved - indeed, must be resolved - by the final authoritative voice of this Court.

2.) At least forty States, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, impose criminal penalties on those who assist another to commit suicide. The following states and territories have statutes which impose criminal penalties for aiding, assisting, causing, or promoting suicide: Alaska Stat., 11.41.120(a)(2); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., 13-1103(A)(3); Ark. Stat. Ann., 5-10-104(a)(2); Cal. Penn. Code, 401; Colo. Rev. Stat., 18-3-104(1)(b); Conn. Gen. Stat., 53a-56(a)(2); Del. Code Ann., tit. 11, 645; Flas. Stat. Ann., 782.08; Ga. Code Ann. 16-5-5 (b); Ill. Comp. Stat. ch. 720, 5/12-31; Ind. Stat. Ann., 35-42-1-2.5(b); Ia. Code, 707A.1, 707A.2 and 707A.3, as ammended by Acts of the 76th General Assembly, 1996 Session; Kan. Stat. Ann., 21-3406; Ky. Rev. Stat., 216:302; La. Rev. Stat., 14:32.12; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 176-A 204; Minn. Stat. Ann., 609.215; Miss. Code Ann., 97-3-49; Mo. Ann. Stat.,565.023(1)(2); Mont. Code Ann., 45-5-105; Neb. Rev. Stat., 28-307; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann., 630:4; N.J. Stat. Ann., 2C: 11-6; N.M. Stat. Ann., 30-2-4; N.Y. Penal Law, 120.30, 125.15(3); N.D. Cent. Code, 12.1-16-04; Okla. Stat. Ann, tit. 21 813-818; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann., 2505; P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 33. 4009; S.D. Codified Laws Ann., 22-16-37; Tenn. Code Ann., 39-13-216; Tex. Penal Code Ann., 22.08; V.I. Code Ann., tit. 14, 2141; Wash Rev. Code Ann., 9A.36.060; and Wis Stat. Ann., 940.12. The following states have statutes which impose criminal penalties for negligent homocide which are broad enough to encompass aiding, assisting, causing, or promoting suicide: Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 428-429 (Mass. 1877); People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich.1994); Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163 (Ohio 1872); State v. Jones, 86 S.C. 17, 67 S.E. 160, 165 (S.C. 1910); and State v. Wills, 121 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. 1961).
3.) People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 480 n. 57, 527 N.W.2d 714, 732 n. 57 (!994) ("For reasons apparent in our analysis of the process claims, we also reject the argument that Michigan's assisted suicide statute is invalid because it denies equal protection to terminally ill persons who want help in ending their lives, i.e., it denies them the right enjoyed by terminally ill persons who opt to forgo or discontinue life-sustaining medical treatment. As we explained, the two situations are not the same for purposes of constitutional analysis."), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1795 (1995).
4.) At the threshold, it should be recognized that there is a danger in using euphamistic language such as "hastening death" when referring to the act of suicide. Such language, which is often utilized by proponents of assisted suicide, has a tendency to obfuscate the reality of the important questions which end-of-life cases generally present. See People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 464 n. 27, 527 N.W.2d 714, 725 n. 27 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1795 (1995), and Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Mo. banc 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
5.) People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 480, 527 N.W.2d 714, 732 (1994)(footnote omitted), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1795 (1995). See. e.g., Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 627 (1982) (essential dissimilarity" between right to decline medical treatment and any right to end one's life); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 351, 486 A2d 1209, 1224 (1985); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App.3d 1127, 1145, 225 Cal.Rptr. 297, 306 (1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal.App.3d 186, 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225-226 (1984); People v. Adams, 216 CalApp.3d 1431, 1440, 265 Cal. Rptr. 568, 573-574 (1990); Donaldson v. Lungren, 2 Cal. App.4th 1614, 1619-1623, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 59, 61-64 (1992) and cases cited therin; Thor v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.4th 725, 742, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 357, 367-368 (1993); DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 706-707 (Ky. 1993). Cf. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 51-52 and n. 9, 355 A.2d 647, 669-670 and n. 9 (neither attempted nor aiding suicide implicated in circumstances similar to those presented), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See also Thomas J. Marzen, et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 Duq. L. Rev. 1, 10 n. 34 (1985), and cases cited therein.
6.)See Thomas J. Marzen, "Out, Out Brief Candle": Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide for the Terminally Ill, 21 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, No. 3, 799, 806 n. 25 (1994)("...legislatures that have codified the right to refuse treatment in the same legislation reject any affirmative act to end life.") citing natural death/living will statutes of forty States.